This paper constructs a model of an exchange economy in which bankruptcy arises in a manner similar to what we observe. Compared to related models, this model is a more realistic representation of some markets in which intertemporal assets are traded. Using standard and natural assumptions, it is shown that every economy represented by this model has an equilibrium. Therefore, bankruptcy can co-exist with smoothly functioning competitive markets in fairly general economies. Examples highlight some welfare effects of bankruptcy.
Introduction
In recent years, household debt has increased greatly, and a greater proportion of this debt is being traded in asset markets through securitized pools of assets. According to the Federal Reserve, home mortgage and other consumer debt increased from $3.3 trillion at the end of 1990 to $7.1 trillion at the end of 2001, and the proportion of this debt that is securitized and outstanding in capital markets increased from 34 percent to 55 percent over the same period.
An increase in household debt has also been accompanied by an increase in the personal bankruptcy rate, from 2.8 per thousand people in 1990 to 5.1 per thousand in 2001. Thus, there is a greater chance that a household's debt is currently being traded in asset markets through a securitized pool of assets, and bankruptcy affects creditors invested in such pools. Because agents can be buyers of some assets and sellers of others, default by some debtors leads to partial recovery for their creditors and this might force these creditors to default on their debt to others. This can set off a chain reaction resulting in widespread default and bankruptcy. As more and more people invest in asset markets (either directly or indirectly) these chain reactions can potentially affect a large proportion of the population.
These observations show that in order to understand the operation of modern competitive asset markets, it is important to understand how bankruptcies filter through and affect investors in a securitized pool of assets, how they affect recovery rates on assets, and how they affect trading and the allocation of resources through the mechanism of markets. To do this, it is important to understand the legal framework governing bankruptcy (for example, the rights of creditors and debtors in bankruptcy law and the role of exemptions), and the trading institutions governing credit (for example, the effects of credit limits on asset trade and the role of an agent's default history in determining her credit limit and future trading ability).
This paper constructs a model of an exchange economy that can be used to analyze these issues. The view in this paper (and also in some of the other papers mentioned below) is that default and bankruptcy are important economic phenomena that can be part of an economic equilibrium with competitive markets, and these phenomena are consistent with smoothly functioning asset markets.
As we know, in our society, the issue of bankruptcy is very old. In the United States, a Bankruptcy clause (Clause 4 of Section 8 of Article I) was adopted in its Constitution on September 3, 1787 (see Warren (1935) , page 5). There might be moral arguments for allowing agents to discharge their debt. However, as the following paragraphs show, debates on bankruptcy bills provide ample economic justifications for such a discharge.
Allowing for repudiation of debt through bankruptcy law can increase economic activity and improve welfare of society. This idea has been in public discussion for at least 200 years. For example, Warren (1935) , on page 16, writes the following about the debate on a bankruptcy bill in 1792; "the advocates of the bill, largely from the commercial sections of the country, pointed out the necessity of restoring to active trade-life the thousands of debtors then in jail or else unable to resume business by reason of their load of undischarged debts; and they further urged the necessity of preventing such a condition from again arising." And again on page 18, "As Jefferson wrote to Madison: 'The whole commercial race are lying on their oars and gathering in their affairs, not knowing what new failure may put their resources to the proof.' In the existing stagnation of commerce, he said, loans could not be made or money transferred from one city to another." Using the language of modern economics, we can say that an equilibrium in an economy with bankruptcy can have more asset trade than, and strongly pareto dominate an equilibrium in the corresponding economy without bankruptcy.
Similarly, the idea of an optimal bankruptcy law, one that balances rights of a creditor against the misfortune of a debtor, has been in public discussion for at least 200 years. For example, Warren (1935) , on page 17, writes the following about the views of James A. Bayard of Delaware in 1792, "A bankrupt law he held was necessary to protect creditors from dishonest and fraudulent debtors, as well as to enable creditors to protect honest debtors whose trade had been subjected to unforeseen accidents who shall surrender all their property in order to obtain a discharge." And again on page 166, he quotes the following objective of a bankruptcy law from the papers of James A. Bayard, "Its object is, in the first place, to support mercantile credit, by protecting the rights of creditors against the fraud of dishonest and the folly of imprudent debtors who may waste or conceal their property while the ordinary forms of law are going on against them; and secondly to encourage fair industry and prudent conduct, by enabling honest debtors reduced by misfortune, to give up their property, free themselves entirely from their debts, and begin the world anew, which no man will ever have the courage to do, while a load of old debts is hanging on him." Thus, an optimal credit limit and exemption level depends, among other things, on the characteristics of the agents in the economy. 1 In economics, there is an extensive literature on bankruptcy. The models in this literature provide important insights about optimal debt contracts, about optimal corporate debt versus equity, and about dynamic credit cycles. The reader can get a flavor of some of these models from the important papers of Townsend (1979) , Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , Aghion and Hermalin (1990) , Hart and Moore (1994) , Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) , White (1998) , and Wang and White (2000) . This list is by no means comprehensive. Models in the partial equilibrium framework do not always capture the feedback effects that are captured naturally in the general equilibrium framework, some of these models exogenously specify whether an economic agent is a debtor or creditor, (hence in these models, agents cannot be buyers of some assets and sellers of others,) and there is little heterogeneity among the economic agents involved.
The first papers to include bankruptcy in general equilibrium with complete markets appear to be by Shubik (1972) , and Shubik and Wilson (1977) . In the framework of an extensive model of general equilibrium with complete markets, the seminal paper by Kehoe and Levine (1993) draws on the literature on dynamic consistency, and introduces individual rationality constraints in the form of endogenous debt limits. These constraints imply that in an equilibrium, no agent defaults in any state. Alvarez and Jermann (2000) (building on Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996) ) cast these constraints in the form of portfolio constraints, and investigate limited risk-sharing. These models provide important insights in understanding consumption and risk sharing, but by their very construction, these models cannot explain the existence of default or bankruptcy as an equilibrium phenomenon.
The model presented in this paper belongs to the class of economic models of general equilibrium with incomplete markets, or GEI-models. 2 This framework includes the seminal paper by Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1997) , and other models proposed by Zame (1993) , Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Zame (1997) , Modica, Rustichini, and Tallon (1999) , and Araujo and Pascoa (2002) . Some of the economic justifications for allowing default and bankruptcy that are mentioned above can be seen formally in the seminal model by Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1997) , in the important paper by Zame (1993) , in other models mentioned above, and also in the model constructed in this paper. Moreover, in the model constructed in this paper, we can directly see the effect of institutional details like exemptions and credit limits on asset trade, debt recovery, and equilibrium allocations. In computational models, important insights about the welfare effects of bankruptcy law have been formalized recently. For example, Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2002) conclude that the welfare gain from eliminating Chapter 7 bankruptcy can be substantial. In contrast, when production is included in a model with choice between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy, Li and Sarte (2002) conclude that eliminating Chapter 7 bankruptcy causes significant declines in both output and welfare.
The model by Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1997) presents important insights about the operation of incomplete competitive markets in the presence of default. It also formalizes the belief that default is consistent with a smooth functioning of competitive markets. As penalty for default, Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1997) assume that an agent incurs a loss in utility when she defaults, the loss increasing proportionately in value of default. In their words, utility penalties are "interpreted as the sum of third party punishment, future (unmodelled) reputation losses, and pangs of conscience" (see page 9 of their paper). However, utility penalties exist in the psyche of the consumer. Such penalties leave the creditor no legal recourse for debt recovery, they exclude the role of the legal framework in determining an agent's choice set, and they rule out any effect of an agent's default history on her future access to asset markets. Utility penalties, by subsuming these relevant economic processes, prevent any analysis of them. In the model constructed in this paper, there are no direct utility penalties. Instead, some components of the existing framework of economic and legal processes are abstracted, and their effects on an agent's choice environment are formalized.
Also, in a general equilibrium model of bankruptcy, there can be what we may call a trivial equilibrium -an equilibrium in which agents expect economy-wide bankruptcy and no recovery on the assets, and hence there is no trade in the assets. As Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik point out, with pessimistic expectations about debt recovery, this is a possibly realistic equilibrium. Of course, we also want to know when there is a non-trivial equilibrium. Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik show the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium by ruling out the trivial equilibrium. They rule it out by requiring agents to expect full recovery on each asset in which there is no trade (or more precisely, on each asset for which the aggregate value of promised delivery is zero). They motivate this by writing (on page 17), "one can (but need not) interpret these expectations as if the government guaranteed delivery on the first infinitesimal promises". This might not hold when a government is reluctant or unable to credibly guarantee delivery. Moreover, this expectational refinement is based on an endogenous variable (value of promised delivery). In the model constructed in this paper, there is no such expectational refinement, there can be a trivial equilibrium, and the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium is proved by making assumptions about the exogenous parameters of the model. Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Zame (1997) require the seller of an asset to purchase collateral which can be confiscated if she defaults. To operationalize this, Dubey, Geanakoplos and Zame treat all goods as durable. At the time of delivery, if an agent defaults, she loses the undepreciated portion of the collateral. The penalty of losing the undepreciated value of collateral is economic in nature, and therefore, it avoids the difficulties of utility penalties. However, in their model, an agent is never bankrupt. This is because in their model, the amount that an agent has to repay on her debt is never greater than the value of the undepreciated collateral. (This also implies that debt recovery from an agent on one claim is insensitive to an agent's exposure to other claims.) The creditor has no legal recourse over and above this value if this value is less than the value of the promised payoff. Since an agent has to purchase collateral when she sells an asset, she always has enough resources to repay her debt. Hence, she is never bankrupt. In the model constructed in this paper, there is bankruptcy. Moreover, it is shown that we can have bankruptcy without invoking the apparatus of durable goods or securing lending by an already identified portion of an agent's income. Modica, Rustichini, and Tallon (1999) assume that an agent is aware of the existence of some states of the world and unaware of others. Each agent plans only for states of which she is aware, and in such a state her plan accounts for full payment on all her debts. If a state occurs of which an agent is unaware, and in this state she has enough resources to repay her debts, she repays her debts fully. Otherwise, she defaults. Since different agents might be unaware of different states, an agent expects partial repayment on her holdings of assets even in states of which she is aware. Modica, Rustichini and Tallon assume that in a state of which an agent is unaware, the maximum penalty for default that a court imposes on her is her income in that state. In a state of which an agent is aware, they say that an agent repays her debt because "a court could impose large penalties if it discovered that the agent is bankrupt" (page 261). Suppose this penalty is the same as the one in a state of which she is unaware. Modica, Rustichini and Tallon assume that the preference of every agent is strongly monotone and convex. In addition, suppose there is one agent who has a bounded intertemporal rate of substitution. In this case if the price of any asset is positive this agent wants to sell an infinite amount of the asset. Therefore, for asset markets to clear it is necessary that the price of every asset is zero, which essentially means that asset markets shut down. Thus, in any equilibrium of such an economy, if the price of any asset is to be positive it must be that the penalty which a court imposes in a state of which an agent is aware is larger than the one it imposes in a state of which she is unaware. This implies that a court is cognizant of which states an agent is aware or unaware. Such cognizance is implausible because the notion of an agent's subjective state space is intrinsic to the agent. Thus, in an important sub-collection of economies represented by their model, there appears to be an interpretive difficulty. Araujo and Pascoa (2002) independently propose a model that is close in spirit to the one constructed in this paper. One difference is that they assume that there is a fraction such that this fraction of every agent's income cannot be garnished by creditors. This implies that the level of exemption of a rich agent can be substantially larger than that of a poor agent. With the fixed level of exemption that we actually observe, it can be that a very small fraction of the endowment of a poor individual is garnished and a large fraction of the endowment of a rich individual is garnished. 3 The model constructed in this paper captures this aspect of an exemption. Another difference is that Araujo and Pascoa assume that assets have nominal payoffs whereas in the model constructed in this paper, assets have real payoffs. Moreover, the model by Araujo and Pascoa is limited to two periods, and so it does not capture the effect of prior default by an agent on her future trading opportunity. In the model constructed in this paper, these effects are captured fairly generally by the introduction of credit limits.
The models by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik, by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Zame, by Modica, Rustichini and Tallon, and by Araujo and Pascoa all have only two time periods, and therefore, cannot capture the effect of an agent's default history on her future trading opportunity. The earliest such an effect can be captured is in the third period. The model constructed in this paper has finitely many periods. In it, the default history of an agent can affect her future trading opportunity in a fairly general manner.
The construction of the model in this paper, and the proof of existence of an equilibrium retains much of the flavor of the Arrow-Debreu model and the GEI model, but the reader will find the following features specific to this model, and to the proof presented here.
In the model constructed in this paper, in any period and state of the world, if the excess of an agent's (gross) income over the value of her exemption is less than what she owes, the only penalty imposed on her in that period and state is forfeiture of this excess income. Because her liability is limited to this excess income, an agent might want to sell an infinite amount of an asset, and this can jeopardize existence of an equilibrium. To prevent this, the notion of a credit limit is introduced. Such a limit implies a bound on asset sales, and helps us apply standard techniques to prove existence of an equilibrium.
In the model constructed in this paper, a credit limit system is exogenous. This prevents an investigation of endogenously arising credit limits, but helps us understand the welfare effects of differently specified credit limits. As described in more detail below, other than providing a bound on asset sales, credit limit systems admissible in this model can be fairly general in how they utilize an agent's default history.
From a practical point of view, we know that an individual's ability to sell an asset and take on debt is restricted by some credit limit. 4 The model in this paper is motivated by anonymous trading of standardized debt contracts in markets for asset-backed securities. As usual in GEI-models, the collection of assets, including standardized debt contracts, is exogenously specified. For standard debt contracts such as credit card debt, (or standard home loans or automobile loans,) a financial intermediary such as a bank or a finance company estimates an agent's repayment ability using standardized criteria, and determines her credit limit. This allows the agent to sell some amount of a standardized debt contract. The model allows for finitely many assets, and is flexible enough to incorporate individualized credit limits, credit limits that depend on some classes of agents, and credit limits that are independent of agents.
4 A practical exogenous bound on asset sales could be motivated by restricting sales of assets so that promises of delivery of real goods next period are less than aggregate endowment of all goods in the economy. This would not cover offsetting financial contracts, but is arguably a reasonable upper bound on short sales.
In the model, the definition of disposable income implies that the budget set of an agent can be non-convex. To guarantee that aggregate demand is convex-valued, it is assumed that the model has a continuum of agents, and their distribution is atomless.
In the proof of existence of an equilibrium, in addition to an agent's optimal choice of a consumption and portfolio plan, it is important to know the loss and debt information associated with this plan. The demand set is extended to include this information. Also, in the proof, it is necessary to have a procedure to compute the default rate from aggregate loss and aggregate debt. A default rate correspondence is defined to carry out this computation. Both these modifications can jeopardize a naive adoption of a standard proof of existence of an equilibrium (for example, as given in Hildenbrand (1974)) . Part of what is shown in this paper is that a careful adoption of a standard proof of existence of an equilibrium is possible even with these modifications. This shows that in the existence proof in this paper, we may use intuition similar to that used in a standard proof of existence of an equilibrium. It also shows the power and adaptability of the standard proof.
To formalize and prove the claims mentioned above, the paper proceeds in the following manner. In the next section, the model is specified, an economy and an equilibrium in it are defined, and the main results are stated. In the section after that, the main results are proved. After that, some welfare effects of bankruptcy are presented. Finally, some ways in which we may modify and extend the model are pointed out.
Specification of the Model
The model is specified in the following manner. First, the organization of economic activity in an exchange economy in which there is bankruptcy is outlined. This helps us understand the role of the relevant economic and legal entities and the relations among them. Then, some basic concepts are formally introduced. After that, abstracting some components from the existing legal framework, the rights of creditors and debtors in the model are formalized. This helps determine the financial position of an agent in the model. After that, from some trading restrictions that we observe, a credit limit for an agent in the model is postulated. This helps formalize the role of credit limits in the model. Finally, a budget set, a demand set, an economy, and an equilibrium in an economy are defined, and the main results are stated.
At an elementary level, an individual becomes bankrupt if his choice set includes plans which entail his becoming bankrupt in some states of the world, and he chooses such a plan. His choice set might include such plans because of uncertainty, as well as the legal framework. Uncertainty (about his ability to honor promises of future delivery of goods) enables an agent to make promises of future delivery of goods which, in some states, exceed his ability to honor them. The legal framework allows him, in some situations, to renege on his promise, and in the provisions of bankruptcy law, seek protection from creditors. Thus, there is personal bankruptcy because uncertainty combined with the institutional framework allows plans which entail bankruptcy in some states of the world to be included in an individual's choice environment, and he chooses such a plan.
In an exchange economy in which there is bankruptcy, economic activity might be organized as follows. There are consumption goods and assets. Agents use assets to move income among different time periods and among different states of the world so that they can finance the bundle of consumption goods that they desire most. One way to move future income to the present is by getting a loan. This is like selling a promise for future delivery of some good.
When an agent goes to a bank or a credit institution to get a loan, the lenders never determine his actual ability to repay the loan in every possible state of the world. Rather, they estimate this ability. They estimate the agent's future salary, confirm his employment status, evaluate his default history and determine the riskiness of the loan by considering repayment schedules on similar loans to others. Using standardized criteria they determine an agent's credit limit. An agent can get a loan up to his credit limit. In this view, a bank or a credit institution serves mainly as a check-point that imposes a credit limit constraint on an agent if he wants to sell a promise for future delivery of some good. As long as an agent's promise for future delivery satisfies the constraint imposed by this check-point, he may sell such promises.
The lenders aggregate these loans to manufacture a composite security, pieces of which are traded in asset markets. 5 An agent purchasing a unit of this asset gets a slice of the underlying loans and bears the average default risk on them. 6 At the time of repayment, creditors have some claim to a debtor's income. However, to ensure that the debtor is not left penniless, bankruptcy law provides for some exemptions. 7 A debtor's income up to the value of these exemptions is exempted from forfeiture even if he has debt outstanding (an abstraction of §522(b)(1) of Title 11 of the United States Code Annotated). Although creditors cannot reach into a debtor's exemptions to recover their money, they have a prior claim to the 5 For example, markets in which collateralized mortgage obligations are traded, markets in which credit card debt is traded, and markets in which car loans are traded.
6 In thinking about securitized pools of assets, this paper follows Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1997 Agents use their disposable income to finance their consumption. Total loss on an asset is the aggregate of loss from each agent on this asset. The ratio of total loss on an asset to total debt owed on it is the default rate on the asset. Creditors bear the loss in proportion to their asset holdings.
The model of an exchange economy that is constructed in this paper has the essential features mentioned above. A natural notion of equilibrium in such an economy is a collection of prices, default rates and individual plans such that individuals are optimizing, markets are clearing and the default rate on an asset equals the ratio of total loss on that asset to total debt owed on it. With this notion of equilibrium, and using standard assumptions about preferences and endowments, and using natural assumptions about the rights of creditors and debtors and about credit limits, it is shown that every economy represented by this model has an equilibrium.
Let us look at some basic concepts. Partial order on K , K = 1, 2, . . ., is the usual one. 9 For any ξ ∈ K , ξ + denotes the positive part of ξ and is the vector with k-th component ξ k if ξ k ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise, and ξ − denotes the negative part of ξ and is the vector with k-th component −ξ k if ξ k ≤ 0 and 0 otherwise. Thus, for
The model has a finite number of periods, indexed t = 1, . . . , T , and a finite number of states, indexed s = 1, . . . , S. Each state s is a particular history of the environment from period 1 through period T . The events observable in period t are given by a partition S t of {1, . . . , S}. To reflect dependence of actions in period A description of the Bankruptcy Code is given in Epstein (1995) , and a quick overview in White (1998) .
+ is the set of those elements in E which are greater than or equal to 0.
t on events observable in that period, let us say that a function on {1, . . . , S} is S t -measurable if it is constant on each event E t ∈ S t . To reflect the additional availability of information as time goes on, it is assumed that the sequence of partitions, S = (S t ) T t=1 , is nondecreasing in fineness and call it an information structure.
is S t -measurable be the subspace of S consisting of vectors which are S t -measurable and let R =
The model has a finite number of consumption goods, indexed = 1, . . . , L. The consumption space in period t is X t = (R L t ) + , and the consumption space is
∈ X is a consumption plan which entails consumption of x t (s) units of good in period t, state s.
The model has a finite number of assets or contracts, 10 indexed j = 1, . . . , J. Their payoff in period t is summarized by a S × J matrix of asset returns, denoted A t . Its sj-th component, denoted A t (s) j , specifies the (non-negative) payoff of asset j in period t, state s in terms of good = 1. For convenience, it is assumed that A 1 is the zero matrix and to reflect the dependence of asset returns on the information available, it is assumed that for each t ≥ 2, A t (·) is S t -measurable. The sequence of asset return matrices, A = (A t ) T t=1 , is called an asset structure. Portfolios of assets are defined as follows. The portfolio space in period
∈ Z is a portfolio plan which entails a holding of z t (s) j units of asset j in period t, state s. Occasionally, we shall run across the notation z t−1 , where t = 1. Whenever we have to consider a portfolio z 0 , let us use z 0 = 0.
Prices of goods and assets are defined as follows. The price space in period
∈ ∆ is a price system with p t (s) the price of a unit of good in period t, state s, and q t (s) j the price of a unit of asset j in period t, state s. The model has a continuum of agents
is a measure space with µ a complete, finite, atomless measure. Each agent i has a preference relation , i ⊂ X × X, which is complete, reflexive, transitive, convex, continuous, and strongly monotone (x >x ⇒ x i´x ), 11 and an endowment 10 In this model, assets have long lives. However, it is easy to incorporate in this model assets with short lives. In fact, if there are only assets with short lives, it is easier to prove some components of the proof of existence of an equilibrium. Also, all welfare effects given in this paper remain true even if assets have short lives.
11 The notions of indifference (∼ i ) and strict preference ( i ) are the usual ones.
It is assumed that the collection of endowments, (w i ) i∈I , lies in a bounded set, it satisfies inf i w i 0, and that the map i → ( i , w i ) is measurable. These are the basic concepts. Let us now look at the rights of creditors and debtors in the model and use these to determine the financial position of an agent.
We know that there are laws governing priority of claims of creditors on a debtor's income and laws protecting debtors from the claims of creditors. Abstracting some components from this legal framework, the following is assumed about the decision making environment of an agent in the model. (1) There is an exemption -that is, a bundle of goods such that for each good, the value of an agent's endowment of this good up to the value of this good in the exemption bundle is exempted from forfeiture even if he has debts outstanding, (2) a creditor has a prior claim to the excess of a debtor's income over the value of the debtor's exemption, and (3) the claim of any creditor on an agent's income has the same priority as the claim of any other creditor. These assumptions describe the rights of creditors and debtors in the model. 12 The first assumption implies that the exemption value of an agent is the sum over goods of the minimum of value of his endowment of each good and the value of this good in the exemption bundle. The second assumption implies that if the liquidation value of an agent -that is, the excess of his (gross) income over his exemption value -is greater than the debt he owes, his liability is the debt he owes. Otherwise, his liability is his liquidation value. The third assumption implies that creditors share losses from a debtor in proportion to what he owes them. If we think of unsecured lending as lending which is not secured by an already identified portion of future income but only by a general claim on it then this model has only unsecured lending. 13 To see an illustration of the notion of a default rate on an asset, suppose that total loss from agents on this asset is β, and total debt owed by them on this asset is γ, with 0 ≤ β ≤ γ, and γ > 0. Then, the default rate on this asset is α = β γ , and recovery rate 1 − α. Thus, default rate on an asset in a particular period and state is a number between 0 and 1 that tells us the proportion of debt which is bad. This motivates the following notation.
The default rate space in period t = 1 is
(Here, 0 is the vector of zeros and 1 the vector of ones, both in
default rate system with α t (s) j the default rate on asset j in period t, state s. To ensure that in each period and state the value of the exemption is not zero, it is assumed that an exemption is an element e ∈ X such that e 0. Let us now determine the financial position of an agent. Suppose (p, q, α) is a price and default rate system, and z i a portfolio plan for agent i. In pe-12 A limitation of this model is that it does not allow for renegotiation. 13 We can interpret an asset in this model as a reduced form representation of the unsecured portion of an underlying asset, but this interpretation is not forced.
t−1 (s) + from his period t − 1 asset purchases, but expects to receive only 
For t = 1 this reduces to p 1 (s)w i 1 (s). It is trivial to check that agent i is bankrupt in period t, state s, if and only if
to the pool of bad debts. Otherwise, he contributes nothing to the pool of bad debts. The loss from agent i in period t,
The ratio of loss from agent i in a period and state to what he owes in it is the proportion of his debt that creditors cannot recover. Therefore, the loss from agent i on asset j is this proportion of what he owes on asset j. Formally, the loss from agent i on asset j in period t, state s is
This summarizes the financial position of an agent in the model. Let us now look at trading restrictions, and how these limit the ability of an agent to take on debt.
From a practical point of view, we know that an individual's ability to sell an asset and take on debt is restricted by some credit limit. In the model, a bound on an agent's ability to sell an asset is important, because with a positive asset price, debt obligation limited by exemption value and no bound on asset sales, there are many cases in which an agent wants to sell an infinite amount of the asset. 15 Therefore, for asset markets to clear it is necessary that the price of every asset be zero, which essentially means that asset markets shut down. A credit limit implies a bound on asset sales. It is this property of a credit limit that is abstracted and formalized.
We know that a credit limit which an individual faces depends, among other things, on an estimate of his ability to deliver the goods, on his default history, and on the price of the asset. 16 In the model, this is formalized in the following definition.
Let Q = q ∈ R J + there is p ∈ R L + and (p, q) ∈ ∆ , and for every j, s, t with
) that is weakly decreasing in β. 17 To reflect the dependence of a credit limit on the information available in a particular period, it is assumed that for every t, C i (q, β) t depends only on q t and β t where t ≤ t. A credit limit system is a map C : i → C i . It is assumed that this map is measurable, 18 that C i evaluated at β = 0 when viewed as a function of i and q is bounded, and that for every j, s, t
The last two assumptions are useful in proving the main results in this paper. We can think of these assumptions in the following manner. The last assumption says that if in a particular period and state, the price of an asset is zero then, regardless of his default history, almost no agent can sell this asset. Of course, if the price of an asset is zero, and if an agent selling this asset has to deliver something on this asset he will choose not to sell the asset, and this assumption is superfluous. This assumption is useful in the case when, even though the price of an asset is zero, an agent is indifferent between selling or not selling the asset. This happens if the agent is not required to deliver anything on the asset, or if he is bankrupt in the 15 For example, every agent with strongly monotone and convex preferences who has a bounded intertemporal rate of substitution wants to sell an infinite amount of the asset. 16 The price of an asset will reflect the riskiness of the asset.
next period. In this situation, the last assumption implies that the agent does not sell the asset. The assumption before the last one says that, in a particular period and state, if the price of an asset is bounded away from zero, then there are some agents who, regardless of their default history, can sell this asset. This captures the idea that a credit limit for an agent looks not just to the past but also to the future. It looks to the future in the sense that there are some agents who, even though they have a bad default history, will have some money in the next period, and hence are allowed to undertake some promises of future delivery.
In this model, it is assumed that a credit limit system is exogenous. It would be more satisfying to endogenize this by postulating an abstract credit limit agency which determines the credit limit of an agent as the result of an optimization procedure. At the very least, we might expect this procedure to assign a smaller credit limit to an agent when (expected) loss from this agent is higher in future periods. However, as an example given below shows, creditors might prefer debtors to have more debt even when they expect debtors to cause them greater (expected) losses in the future. This shows that the notion of an optimal credit limit depends on the characteristics of agents. Keeping credit limits exogenous allows us to see the effect of different credit limits on equilibrium outcomes.
Also, in the model, it is assumed that agents can have individualized credit limits. This does not mean that agents lose their trading anonymity. At most, they lose their anonymity to a credit-setting financial intermediary like a bank, a brokerage house or some other lending institution. Just like they lose their anonymity to a settlement system which allocates a bankrupt agent's income among his creditors. In the model in this paper, (and to an extent in the other models mentioned above,) these intermediaries are abstracted away because they are assumed to play a passive and standardized role in the economy. This allows us to focus on the trading and allocative aspects of competitive markets. Once credit limits for agents are determined, (intuitively, by financial intermediaries using standardized criteria in a passive manner,) and a settlement system is in place, these agents can trade anonymously through markets.
Of course, it is easy and obvious to see that the model in this paper can be modified so that credit limits are independent of agents. This also implies that in determining a credit limit for an agent, we use some measure of loss independent of particular agents (for example, we can use aggregate loss). Slightly more generally, depending on some characteristics of agents, we can partition the agents into a few classes, and for agents in each class, use their aggregate loss to determine their credit limit. Some other modifications and extensions of this model are given in the last section of this paper.
Using the definition of a credit limit, the notion that an agent sells assets subject to a check-point authorization is formalized in the following definition of admissibility of a portfolio plan. Let (p, q, α) be a price and default rate system, and
Here, E t (s) is the event in S t which contains s, and β i (p, q, α, z i ) is the profile of loss from agent i on every asset in every period and state. The concept of admissibility formalizes the idea that an agent's ability to take on debt depends, among other things, on an agent-specific component which includes his default history, and on the price of the asset which reflects the riskiness of the asset. Using portfolio admissibility, a bound on asset sales follows immediately.
Lemma 1. Let C be a credit limit system. Then there isẑ ∈ Z such that for every price and default rate system (p, q, α) ,
and z i are as in the hypothesis. Fix j, s and t ≤ T − 1 arbitrarily. If for every
Then, since z i t (·) and C i (q, 0) t (·) are S t -measurable and since E t (ŝ) = E t (s), we have
from which the desired conclusion follows. We can now easily comprehend what a budget set for an agent will be like in this model. An agent's budget set consists of all consumption and (admissible) portfolio plans which are affordable. His demand set consists of those plans in the budget set which are optimal with respect to his preference relation. Formally, let C be a credit limit system, and (p, q, α) a price and default rate system. For an agent i, a consumption and portfolio plan (
It is strictly affordable if the inequality is strict. The budget set for agent i is
The demand set for agent i is
It is easy to see that B i (p, q, α) is compact if and only if p 0 and q t 0 (for
is not empty then p 0. It is also easy to see that the definition of disposable income implies that the budget set can be non-convex. 19 We now have all the components to define an economy, and an equilibrium in it. An economy represented by this model is a collection
where S = (S t ) T t=1 is an information structure, A = (A t ) T t=1 is an asset structure, ( i , w i ) is the preference relation and endowment of agent i, e is an exemption, and C is a credit limit system. An equilibrium in an economy is a collection (p, q, α; (x i , z i ) i∈I ) where (p, q, α) is a price and default rate system, and
• for every j, s and every t ≥ 2,
The first condition requires equilibrium consumption and portfolio plans to be optimal for almost every agent. The second condition requires markets for goods and assets to clear. The third condition requires the equilibrium default rate on an asset to equal the ratio of total loss on that asset to total debt owed on it, if total debt owed on it is not zero. If total debt owed is zero, the default rate can be any number between zero and one. 20 The main results in this paper are the following two theorems.
Theorem 1. With the stated assumptions, every economy represented by this model has an equilibrium.
One way to prove this theorem is by setting, for every s and every t ≤ T − 1, q t (s) = 0 and α t+1 (s) = 1, and by setting, for every i, z i = 0. Then asset markets are closed in every period so that, in essence, we have a finite collection of sub-economies (each with one period and L consumption goods) without any asset markets connecting them. The standard proof of existence of an equilibrium (as in an Arrow-Debreu economy) also shows that this economy has an equilibrium. However, such an equilibrium is trivial. Formally, an equilibrium (p, q, α; (x i , z i ) i∈I ) in an economy is trivial if for every s and every t ≤ T − 1, either q t (s) = 0 or α t+1 (s) = 1. The proof of existence of an equilibrium that presented in this paper also yields the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Every economy in which for some j, s, t, e t (s) < inf i w i t (s) and A t (s) j > 0 has a non-trivial equilibrium.
Existence of Equilibrium
The two theorems mentioned above are proved as follows. First, the price space is truncated so that prices are bounded away from zero. Then, the relevant information in the economy is summarized in a correspondence on a space which depends on the truncated price space. By Kakutani's theorem, this correspondence has a fixed point. As the truncated price space approaches the untruncated space, there is a sequence of fixed points. From this sequence we get a convergent subsequence, the limit of which gives us an equilibrium.
Let us truncate the price space as follows. For n ≥ L + J and n = ∞, the n-truncated price space in period t ≤ T − 1 is∆ n,t = (p t , q t ) ∈ ∆ t (p t , q t ) ≥ 
The correspondence that summarizes the relevant information in the economy is a product of three correspondences. The first correspondence is the aggregate extended demand correspondence -it relates market variables (price and default rate) to aggregate individual choices (aggregate demand and the corresponding total loss and total debt). The second correspondence is the price correspondence -it relates possible levels of excess demand to prices. The third correspondence is the default rate correspondence -it relates possible levels of total loss and total debt to default rates associated with them.
First, let us look at the aggregate extended demand correspondence, and some of its properties. As a preliminary step, let us look at the demand correspondence. The demand correspondence for agent i associates to every (p, q, α) (p, q, α) . We want to conclude that x i i´xi .
Fix ξ ∈ (0, 1) arbitrarily. Let us first confirm that for all m sufficiently large,
To check for admissibility, temporarily fix j, s, t with t ≤ T − 1. Suppose there is
herefore, ξz i satisfies the admissibility constraint for this j, s, t. This implies that
From the optimality of x i m and the continuity of i we conclude that x i i´xi , as desired.
To define the aggregate extended demand correspondence, the concept of an extended demand set is utilized. The extended demand set extends the demand set to incorporate information on loss and debt associated with an optimal consumption and portfolio plan. Formally, let (p, q, α) be a price and default rate system. Fix n ≥ 1. Let z i be a portfolio plan for agent i.
For n = ∞, the definition remains the same, but with the convention that
and for every j, s, t,
To every (p, q, α) in ∆ × ∇, the n-extended demand correspondence for agent i associates the n-extended demand set D i n (p, q, α) , and the n-aggregate extended demand correspondence associates the set
From the previous lemma, it is easy to see that for each n, including n = ∞, D i n has closed graph on (∆ \ P 0 ) × ∇. In addition to this, if a price and default rate system (p, q, α) satisfies p 0 and q t 0 (for t ≤ T −1), then D i n is uniformly bounded (over i) on a neighborhood of (p, q, α) so that by Proposition D.II.8 in Hildenbrand (1974) 
. 21 The role of the aggregate extended demand correspondence is to aggregate individual demand and the associated loss and debt to yield the aggregate demand and the corresponding aggregate loss and aggregate debt in the economy.
Second, let us look at the price correspondence and some of its properties. Consider, for a fixed aggregate demand in period t, the function which assigns to each price in period t the value of excess demand. Formally, for every n ≥ L + J and n = ∞, every t, and every (
z t ). To see that for every
n ≥ L + J and n = ∞, the n-price correspondence has closed graph and takes non-empty and convex values in a compact set, it is sufficient to state a fact that is easy to prove -for every such n and for every t, θ n,t has closed graph and takes non-empty and convex values in a compact set. The role of the price correspondence is the same as that of its counterpart in the Arrow-Debreu economy. In the words of Debreu (1959) (p.83), the price correspondence "prompts one, when trying to reduce positive excess demands, to put the weight of the price system on those commodities for which the excess demand is the greatest."
Third, let us look at the default rate correspondence and some of its properties. Fix n ≥ 1 and n = ∞. For each (β, γ) ∈ + × + letγ n = max(γ,
{1}
if γ = 0 and β > 0, [0, 1] if γ = 0 and β = 0.
Then, for every n ≥ 1 and n = ∞, φ n is a continuous correspondence with nonempty, compact and convex values. Also, it is easy to see that φ ∞ has closed 21 It is helpful to keep in mind the elementary fact that for a sequence γn ∈ +, if we let
graph and takes non-empty, compact and convex values. For every n, including n = ∞, the n-default rate correspondence in period t = 1, φ n,1 : (R J 1 ) + × (R J 1 ) + → ∇ 1 , is the correspondence which is identically zero, and in period t ≥ 2, φ n,t : (R J t ) + ×(R J t ) + → ∇ t , is the correspondence which associates to each (β t , γ t ) the set × j,s
associates to each (β, γ) the set
From the properties of φ n , it follows that for every n, Φ n has closed graph and takes non-empty, compact and convex values. As in the case of the n-extended demand correspondence, it is easy to see that for any sequence (
The role of the default rate correspondence is to use aggregate loss and debt in the economy to compute the default rate.
These three correspondences summarize the relevant information in the economy. To ensure that the demand correspondence takes non-empty values, and that we are working with a compact and convex space, let us check that for any fixed n ≥ L + J and n = ∞, when prices and default rates are in∆ n × ∇, the actions of agents and the integrals of these actions lie in a fixed, non-empty, compact and convex subset of a Euclidean space, independent of elements in∆ n × ∇.
The bound on asset sales shows that the set of admissible portfolios is bounded below independent of i, independent of prices in∆ n , independent of α, and independent of n (n = ∞). Also, since asset prices are strictly positive, the set of affordable portfolios is bounded above. Since individual endowments lie in a bounded set, this bound can be taken independent of i. Thus, the set of affordable and admissible portfolio plans and their integrals lies in a non-empty, compact, convex setˆZ n ⊂ Z which is bounded below independent of n.
By definition, the set of consumption plans is bounded below by 0. Since individual endowments lie in a bounded set, and the set of affordable portfolio plans is bounded (independent of i, (p, q) ∈∆ n and α), the set of affordable consumption plans is bounded above (independent of i, (p, q) ∈∆ n and α). Thus, the set of affordable consumption plans and their integrals lies in a non-empty, compact, convex setˆX n ⊂ X which is bounded below by 0.
Also, by definition, loss from any agent is bounded below by 0. Since the set of affordable portfolio plans is bounded below, (independent of i, (p, q) ∈∆ n and α,) loss from any agent is bounded above (independent of i, (p, q) ∈∆ n and α). Thus, potential loss from agents and potential aggregate loss in the economy lie in a non-empty, compact, convex setˆR n ⊂ R J which is bounded below by 0. Similarly, potential debt owed to agents and potential aggregate debt in the economy lie in a non-empty, compact, convex subset of R J . If necessary, let us replaceˆR n by a larger compact, convex subset of R J that is bounded below by zero to conclude that potential debt owed to any agent and potential aggregate debt in the economy also lie inˆR n .
To summarize, for n ≥ (L + J) and n = ∞, on∆ n × ∇, the set of individual consumption and portfolio plans and their integrals lies inˆX n ×ˆZ n and the set of potential loss, potential debt, and their integrals lies inˆR n ×ˆR n .
Consider the correspondence Ψ n on∆ n × ∇ ×ˆX n ×ˆZ n ×ˆR n ×ˆR n given by
ˆX n ×ˆZ n →∆ n is given by Ψ 2 n (x, z) = Θ n (x, z), and Ψ 3 n :ˆR n ×ˆR n → ∇ is given by Ψ 3 n (β, γ) = Φ n (β, γ). The properties of the three correspondences given earlier imply that Ψ n satisfies the hypotheses of Kakutani's theorem. For each n ≥ L+J and n = ∞, let (p n , q n , α n , x n , z n ,β n ,γ n ) be a fixed point of Ψ n . Let us check that we can get a convergent subsequence from this sequence of fixed points, and the limit of this subsequence gives us an equilibrium.
Obviously, (p n , q n , α n ) is a bounded sequence. As
To see that (x n , z n ,β n ,γ n ) is bounded, let us use the following lemma.
Proof. Let ζ i n = x i n − w i and ζ n = I ζ i n di. Then, it is sufficient to check that (ζ n , z n ) is a bounded sequence. As ζ i n ≥ −(sup i w i ) and z i n ≥ −ẑ, ζ i n and z i n are uniformly (for almost every i) bounded below, (ζ n , z n ) is bounded below. For upper bounds, we can use induction on {1, . . . , T } as follows;
Step 1: t = 1. We want to see that, for every s, ((ζ n ) 1 (s), (z n ) 1 (s)) is bounded above. Notice that, by Ψ 2 n , for every ((p n ) 1 , (q n ) 1 ) ∈∆ n,1 and every s,
Fix s arbitrarily and let
Thus, (ζ n ) 1 (s) 1 is bounded above. Using the same argument with different indices we see that, for every , j, (ζ n ) 1 (s) and (z n ) 1 (s) j are bounded above. Since s is arbitrary, step 1 is complete.
Step 2: Induction. Suppose that for every s, ((ζ n ) t−1 (s), (z n ) t−1 (s)) is bounded above. We want to see that for every s, ((ζ n ) t (s), (z n ) t (s)) is bounded above. Notice that the disposable income in period t, state s, of almost every agent satisfies
Again, by Ψ 2 n , for every ((p n ) t , (q n ) t ) ∈∆ n,t , and for every s,
Thus, (ζ n ) t (s) 1 is bounded above. Using the same argument with different indices we see that, for every , j, (ζ n ) t (s) and (z n ) t (s) j are bounded above. Since s is arbitrary, step 2 is complete.
From the boundedness of (x n , z n ), we can deduce that (β n ,γ n ) is a bounded sequence. Therefore, the sequence (p n , q n , α n , x n , z n ,β n ,γ n ) is bounded. Replacing this sequence with a convergent subsequence, suppose that this sequence converges to (p, q, α, x, z, β, γ) . The next lemma implies that p 0.
Lemma 4. The sequence (p n ) is bounded away from 0.
Proof. Let
Fix s, t arbitrarily. Then it is sufficient to prove that (p n ) t (s) is bounded away from 0.
Suppose (p n ) t (s) → 0. Then, because ((p n ) t (s), (q n ) t (s)) 1 = 1, it must be that t ≤ T − 1, and also that there is j and a (relabelled) subsequence such that for all n,
This implies that F 1 ∩F 2 ∩F 3 is not empty. For each i in this intersection, agent i can buy one unit more of each good in period t, state s by giving up an arbitrarily small amount of consumption in period t+1, state s. But then, by strong monotonicity and continuity, for all n sufficiently large, we get a contradiction to
In this case the income of almost every agent is bounded away from zero. Using the same argument as in the standard Arrow-Debreu model, we conclude that (p n ) t (s) is bounded away from 0 as desired.
This lemma implies that p 0. Combined with the fact (see proof of the following lemma) that for every j, s, t,
n ) is a uniformly bounded (for almost every i) and uniformly integrable sequence so that, using Lemma D.II.3 in Hildenbrand (1974) (p.69), we conclude that there is an integrable function (x i ,ź i ,β i ,γ i ) i∈I such that, for almost every i,
Here, Ls n is the set of cluster points of the sequence (x i n , z i n ,β i n ,γ i n ). From properties of the n-extended demand correspondence, we conclude that ( , α) from which it follows that for almost every i there exists (
Let us check that (p, q, α; (x i , z i ) i∈I ) is an equilibrium. Since, for almost every i, , α) , the first condition in the definition of equilibrium is satisfied. To see that the second and third conditions in the definition of equilibrium are satisfied, let us use the following lemma. 
Proof. Let us use induction on {1, . . . , T − 1} as follows;
Step 1: t = 1. We want to see that, for every j, s, ζ 1 (s) = 0, z 1 (s) = 0, and α 2 (s) j γ 2 (s) j = β 2 (s) j . Fix s arbitrarily. From Lemma 3, we see that ζ 1 (s) ≤ 0 and
, and z 1 (s) ≤ 0, we have ζ 1 (s) = 0, and for every j,
Since s is arbitrary, step 1 is complete.
Step 2: Induction. Suppose that for every j, s, ζ t−1 (s) = 0, z t−1 (s) = 0, and α t (s) j γ t (s) j = β t (s) j . We want to see that for every j, s, ζ t (s) = 0, z t (s) = 0, and
It follows that ζ t (s) 1 = lim n (ζ n ) t (s) 1 ≤ 0. Using the same argument with different indices we see that ζ t (s) ≤ 0 and z t (s) ≤ 0. Analogous to step 1, we have
Thus, ζ t (s) = 0 and z t (s) = 0. As in step 1, we see that for every j, 0 ≤ β t+1 (s) j ≤ γ t+1 (s) j , and that α t+1 (s) j γ t+1 (s) j = β t+1 (s) j . Since s is arbitrary, step 2 is complete. Finally, the argument showing ζ t (s) = 0 and z t (s) = 0 also works for t = T . This lemma implies that the second and third conditions in the definition of equilibrium are also satisfied. Therefore, (p, q, α; (x i , z i ) i∈I ) is an equilibrium. To see that the second theorem is true, let us use the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Suppose there is s, t such that e t (s) < inf i w i t (s). Then for every j, α t (s) j < 1.
Proof. Since p n is bounded away from zero, (p n ) t (s)(inf i w i t (s) − e t (s)) is also bounded away from zero. Let 0 < δ < 1 be such that for all n,
and for every n such that the denominator of the following fraction is not zero,
Now suppose there is j, s, t such that e t (s) < inf i w i t (s) and A t (s) j > 0. Then t ≥ 2 and α t (s) j < 1 so that if q t−1 (s) j = 0 then the demand set of almost every agent is empty which contradicts the definition of an equilibrium. Thus, q t−1 (s) > 0, α t (s) < 1 and the equilibrium is non-trivial.
Welfare Effects of Bankruptcy
In this section, using examples of economies represented by the model in this paper, we shall see some welfare effects of bankruptcy. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, these welfare effects are well-known in the legal and economics literature. In the general equilibrium framework, many welfare effects of default are already given in Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1997) , in the important paper by Zame (1993) , in Shubik and Wilson (1977) , in Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Zame (1997) , and in Araujo and Pascoa (2002) . In contrast to Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (1997) , the model in this paper explicitly incorporates observable penalties for default into an agent's trading environment. Thus, it is useful to know that these welfare effects can also be seen in economies represented by this model.
We shall see these welfare effects by considering two examples, each of which has several versions. In this section, to notationally distinguish an equilibrium in the model in this paper from an equilibrium in other models, let us refer to an equilibrium in this model as a Bankruptcy equilibrium.
In the first example, we shall see that an asset market which is useless in the GEI model can become useful when we allow for bankruptcy, that every equilibrium in the Bankruptcy model can be at least as good as the equilibrium in the GEI model, and that a Bankruptcy equilibrium can pareto dominate a GEI equilibrium. We shall also see the effects of different levels of exemptions on equilibrium outcomes. If exemptions are too large, there is no possibility of debt recovery, and hence no trade in the asset.
The intuition for these results is that a creditor is willing to lend money to a debtor if the debtor repays her debt in the state in which the creditor likes to consume even though she is bankrupt in the other state. Also, default rates change the return on an asset; this changes the asset span, and can make the asset more useful. Therefore, the institution of bankruptcy allows agents to effectively create a new asset that can lead to a pareto improving equilibrium.
In the second example, we shall see that a pareto optimal Bankruptcy equilibrium strongly pareto dominates the unique equilibrium in the corresponding GEI economy, and cannot be pareto dominated by the unique equilibrium in the corresponding Arrow-Debreu economy. Therefore, even when asset markets are incomplete, and the GEI equilibrium is strongly pareto inefficient, a Bankruptcy equilibrium can result in an efficient market outcome. We shall also see that an increase in the credit limit of a debtor increases the equilibrium trade in the asset, and the equilibrium utility of the creditor even though, in some state of the world, the creditor expects the debtor to be bankrupt and cause her greater losses. Therefore, creditors might want to make it easier for a debtor to take on more debt even when they expect the debtor to become bankrupt in some state of the world. We shall also see that the allocation in a Bankruptcy equilibrium is the same as in the (unique) equilibrium in the corresponding Arrow-Debreu economy. Therefore, even when asset markets are incomplete, and the GEI equilibrium is strongly pareto inefficient, a Bankruptcy equilibrium can overcome market incompleteness and achieve the same allocation as in the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Finally, we shall also see that a decrease in exemption increases the equilibrium utility of the creditor and decreases the equilibrium utility of the debtor. Therefore, creditors want to lobby the legislature for lower exemptions, and debtors want to oppose such a measure.
The intuition for these results is that if the debtor has enough resources to repay her debt in a state in which the creditor likes to consume, then the creditor is better off if the debtor is allowed to take on more debt. This dynamic becomes more beneficial for the creditor when the exemption in this state is low so that the creditor can recover more of her promised payment from the debtor.
In the next subsection, the details of the first example are presented. In the subsection after that, the details of the second example are presented.
First Example
In this example, we shall see that if the decision-making environment of the agents is governed by the GEI model, the only possible equilibrium utilities are those which agents get from consuming their endowments. Therefore, in this environment, markets serve no useful purpose. However, if the decision-making environment is governed by the Bankruptcy model, then in every Bankruptcy equilibrium, utilities are at least as high as those in the GEI model. Also, there are two equilibria in the Bankruptcy model, each of which pareto dominates the equilibrium in the GEI model, and in each of which there is trade in the asset and the debtor is not necessarily credit constrained; that is he might choose not to exhaust his credit limit fully. (In fact, these are the only equilibria in which there is trade in the asset.) Therefore, with the additional institution of bankruptcy, markets can become useful, and can lead to better outcomes. Finally, we shall see the effect of different levels of exemption on equilibrium outcomes. If exemptions are too large there is no possibility of debt recovery, and hence no trade in the asset.
Consider an exchange economy in which there are two time periods, indexed 1 and 2, and two states of the world, indexed 1 and 2. There is no information in period 1, and full information in period 2. There is one consumption good in period 1, and in each state in period 2. The consumption space is 3
+ . An element x = (x 1 , x 2 (1), x 2 (2)) in the consumption space is a consumption plan which entails consumption of x 1 units of the consumption good in period 1, and x 2 (s) units of the consumption good in state s (s = 1, 2) in period 2. There is one asset, given by A = 1 1 . The portfolio space is . An element z of the portfolio space is a portfolio plan which entails holding of z units of the asset. Prices in period 1 are given by (p 1 , q), where p 1 is the price of the consumption good, and q the price of the asset. The price of the consumption good is 1 in each state in period 2. There are two agents, indexed 1 and 2. The preference and endowment of each agent is
In the GEI model, 22 if prices are (p 1 , q) with p 1 > 0, the affordability constraints for agents i = 1, 2 that are relevant to this analysis are
These constraints mean that in every period and state, the value of consumption of every agent equals her income. In the Bankruptcy model, suppose the exemption is (e(1), e(2)), and the credit limit for agent i is C i (q). If prices are (p 1 , q) with p 1 > 0, and default rates are α = (α(1), α(2)), the affordability constraints for agents i = 1, 2 that are relevant to this analysis are
Also, credit limit restrictions mean that for every agent i, z i − ≤ C i (q).
In this example, if agents just consume their endowments, their utilities are (U 1 , U 2 ) = (111, 111), and if their decision-making environment is determined by the GEI model then markets serve no useful purpose, because the unique GEI equilibrium utilities are also (U 1 , U 2 ) = (111, 111). We can check for the GEI equilibrium as follows. Using the affordability constraints for each agent, we can re-write the utility of each agent as ], the corresponding consumption and portfolio plan for agent 1 is given by x 1 = (1 − 101ξ, 10 + ξ, 1 + ξ), z 1 = ξ and that for agent 2 is given by x 2 = (1+101ξ, 1−ξ, 10−ξ), z 2 = −ξ. The unique equilibrium utilities are given by (U 1 , U 2 ) = (111, 111), and in this situation, markets serve no useful purpose.
Notice that in this example, every Bankruptcy equilibrium is at least as good as the GEI equilibrium. This is because for each agent, the consumption and portfolio plan consisting of her endowment and no trade in the asset is always in the agent's budget set. (This is independent of exemptions and credit limits.) Therefore, in each bankruptcy equilibrium, U 1 ≥ 111 and U 2 ≥ 111.
Also, the following Bankruptcy equilibrium pareto dominates the GEI equilibrium, and in this equilibrium there is trade in the asset, and the debtor is not credit constrained. Suppose (e(1), e(2)) = (1, 1) and C 1 (q) = C 2 (q) = 8q. Then
is an equilibrium with utilities (U 1 , U 2 ) = (111, 210). To check that this is an equilibrium, notice that all markets are clearing, the default rate calculations are correct and for each agent, her plan is in her budget set. The only thing left to confirm is that agents are optimizing. Let us first look at the plan for agent 1. Substituting the value of q in the credit limit for agent 1 shows that every admissible portfolio, z 1 , must satisfy z 1 − ≤ 4. The affordability constraints which are relevant to this analysis are
(1) = 10 + z 1 (since z 1 − ≤ 4) and 0 ≤ x 1 2 (2) = 1, whence, U 1 = 1−z 1 +z 1 +10+100(1) = 111 (irrespective of choice of z 1 ). Therefore, the given plan is optimal in the budget set for agent 1. Similarly, the analysis for agent 2 gives us 23 U 2 = 1 − z 2 + 100(max(1 + z 2 , 1)) + 10 − z 2 − . If z 2 ≤ 0, then U 2 = 1 − z 2 + 100 + 10 + z 2 = 111 (irrespective of z 2 ). If z 2 ≥ 0, then U 2 = 1 − z 2 + 100(1 + z 2 ) + 10 = 111 + 99z 2 , whence the optimal choice of z 2 is 1 and U 2 = 210. We conclude that the given plan is optimal in the budget set for agent 2.
With the same exemption and credit limits, and using the same argument as above, it is easy to check that
is also a Bankruptcy equilibrium that pareto dominates the GEI equilibrium, and in this equilibrium also there is trade in the asset and the debtor is not credit constrained.
With the same exemption and credit limits, these are the only Bankruptcy equilibria in which there is trade in the asset. We can see this as follows. Suppose there is an equilibrium with p 1 < 1 2 and z 1 = 0. One possibility is that agent 1 sells the asset. If z 1 < 0, then, because −8 ≤ z 1 , we have
. Therefore, the optimal portfolio choice for agent 1 is z 1 = −8q. Also, −8 ≤ z 1 < 0 implies that the loss from agent one in state one is zero, and in state two is z 1 − , so that the default rate is α = (0, 1). Also, asset market clearing implies that z 2 > 0, so that U 2 = 1 − ≈ 0.297, so that p 1 > 1 2 , a contradiction. Therefore, it cannot be that z 1 < 0. The other possibility is that agent 1 buys the asset. If z 1 > 0, then asset market clearing implies that z 2 < 0. Using the same argument as above, we can see that this is impossible. Therefore, there is no equilibrium with p 1 < 1 2 and z 1 = 0. Suppose there is an equilibrium with p 1 > 1 2 , and z 1 = 0. If z 1 < 0, then
, from which it follows that no negative portfolio choice is optimal for agent 1, which contradicts z 1 < 0. Similarly, if z 1 > 0, then z 2 < 0, so that
, from which it follows that no negative portfolio choice is optimal for agent 2, which contradicts z 2 < 0. Therefore, there is no equilibrium with p 1 > 1 2 and z 1 = 0. We conclude that in an equilibrium in which there is trade in the asset the prices have to be (p 1 , q) = ( 2 ). With a little more work, it is easy to see that with the given exemptions and credit limits, the only equilibria in which there is trade in the asset are the ones given above. Now let us see how exemption levels can affect equilibrium outcomes. Intuitively, when exemptions are large, a creditor wants to buy less of the asset, and the debtor wants to sell more of the asset, because large exemptions reduce the portion of a debtor's income which can be confiscated to repay her debt. If the exemption for an agent is too large it could be that in an equilibrium this agent cannot sell the asset.
The next version of this example shows that if exemptions are too large and prices are (p 1 , q) = ( 1 2 , 1 2 ), then in every Bankruptcy equilibrium there is no trade. Suppose (e(1), e(2)) = (e(1), 1) with 6 < e(1) < 10, 6 < e(2) < 10 C 1 (q) = C 2 (q) = 8q, and (p 1 , q) = ( 1 2 , 1 2 ). Suppose that at these prices there is an equilibrium with z 1 < 0. If e(1) − 10 ≤ z 1 < 0, then U 1 = 1 − z 1 + z 1 + 10 + 100(1) = 111 (irrespective of choice of z 1 ), and if −4 ≤ z 1 ≤ e(1) − 10, then U 1 = 101 + e(1) − z 1 , so that the optimal portfolio choice for agent 1 is z 1 = −4, and U 1 = 105 + e(1) > 111. Asset market clearing implies that z 2 = 4. Combined with the affordability constraint for agent 2 in period 1, we have 0 ≤ 1 − z 2 = −3, a contradiction. Therefore, with these prices, in any equilibrium in which there is trade in the asset, it must be that z 1 > 0, and hence z 2 < 0. But a similar calculation shows that z 2 > 0, a contradiction. Thus in this version there is no trade in equilibrium. This result generalizes a little, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition. Consider the Bankruptcy model with 2 time periods and 1 asset. In every economy represented by this model, if for every s A(s) > 0 ⇒ e(s) ≥ sup i w i 2 (s) then in every Bankruptcy equilibrium of this economy there is no trade in the asset.
Proof. Let (p, q, α, (x i , z i ) i∈I ) be an equilibrium. If q = 0, then the credit limit for almost every agent is 0, so that almost nobody sells the asset. As the asset market is clearing, it must also be that almost nobody is buying the asset. Also, if q > 0 there is no trade in the asset. For if there is trade in the asset, that is, if
. Also, the loss from agent i in such
) from which it follows that the loss from agent i on this asset is
Of course, in a state in which A(s) = 0, we also have, for every i, p 2 (s) 1 (1 − α(s))A(s)z i + = 0. Thus, in every state and for every i, p 2 (s) 1 (1 − α(s))A(s)z i + = 0. As q > 0, using strong monotonicity of preferences, it must be that for almost every i, z i + = 0, and this contradicts the fact that asset markets are clearing. Therefore, whether q = 0 or q > 0, there is no trade in the asset.
An application of this result to this example shows that if exemptions are too large (e(1) ≥ 10 and e(2) ≥ 10) then in every Bankruptcy equilibrium there is no trade in the asset and hence the unique equilibrium utilities are (U 1 , U 2 ) = (111, 111). Notice that this result is independent of credit limits, and the proof uses only strong monotonicity of preferences. An analogous result holds in the model with many time periods and one asset. We shall not look at it in this paper. A summary of the different versions of this example is given in Table 1 at the end of this paper.
Second Example
In this example, we shall see that if the decision-making environment of the agents is governed by the Arrow-Debreu model, then there is a unique equilibrium which is, of course, pareto efficient. If this environment is governed by the GEI model, then there is a unique equilibrium which is strongly pareto inefficient. If this environment is governed by the Bankruptcy model, then there is an equilibrium which is pareto optimal, which strongly dominates the GEI equilibrium, and which cannot be dominated by the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Therefore, even when asset markets are incomplete, and the GEI equilibrium is strongly pareto inefficient, a Bankruptcy equilibrium can result in an efficient market outcome. We shall also see that an increase in the credit limit of a debtor increases the equilibrium trade in the asset, and the equilibrium utility of the creditor even though, in some state of the world, the creditor expects the debtor to be bankrupt, and cause her greater losses. Therefore, creditors might want to make it easier for a debtor to take on more debt even when they expect the debtor to become bankrupt in some state of the world. We shall also see that the allocation in a Bankruptcy equilibrium is the same as in the (unique) equilibrium in the corresponding Arrow-Debreu economy. Therefore, even when asset markets are incomplete, and the GEI equilibrium is strongly pareto inefficient, a Bankruptcy equilibrium can overcome market incompleteness and achieve the same allocation as in the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Finally, we shall also see that a decrease in exemption increases the equilibrium utility of the creditor, and decreases the equilibrium utility of the debtor. Therefore, creditors want to lobby the legislature for lower exemptions, and debtors want to oppose such a measure.
Consider an exchange economy in which there are two time periods, indexed 1 and 2, and two states of the world, indexed 1 and 2. There is no information in period 1, and full information in period 2. There is one consumption good in period 1 and in each state in period 2. The consumption space is 3
+ . An element x = (x 1 , x 2 (1), x 2 (2)) in the consumption space is a consumption plan which entails consumption of x 1 units of the consumption good in period 1, and x 2 (s) units of the consumption good in state s (s = 1, 2) in period 2. There is one asset, given by A = 1 1 . The portfolio space is . An element z of the portfolio space is a portfolio plan which entails holding of z units of the asset. Prices in period 1 are given by (p 1 , q), where p 1 is the price of the consumption good, and q the price of the asset. These prices satisfy 0 ≤ p 1 ≤ 1, and q = 1 − p 1 . The price of the consumption good is 1 in each state in period 2. There are two agents, indexed 1 and 2. The preference and endowment of each agent is U 1 = 100x 1 + x 2 (1) + 50x 2 (2), w 1 = (1, 10, 1),
w 2 = (10, 1, 0).
In the GEI model, if prices are (p 1 , q) with p 1 > 0, the affordability constraints for agents i = 1, 2 that are relevant to this analysis are
Also, credit limit restrictions mean that for every agent i, z i − ≤ C i (q). If the agents just consume their endowments, their utilities are (U 1 , U 2 ) = (160, 110), if their decision-making environment is determined by the complete markets Arrow-Debreu model, their unique (and pareto efficient) equilibrium utilities are (U 1 , U 2 ) = (1150, 1100), 24 and if their decision-making environment is determined by the GEI model, their unique (and strongly pareto inefficient) equilibrium utilities are (U 1 , U 2 ) = (1109, 201). We can check for the GEI equilibrium as follows. Using the affordability constraints for each agent, we can re-write the utility of each agent as U 1 = 100(1 − 
), x 1 = (11, 9, 0),
is the unique equilibrium with utilities (U 1 , U 2 ) = (1109, 201).
24 the unique equilibrium prices and allocations are (p1, p2(1), p2(2)) = ( ) and x 1 = (11, 0, 1), x 2 = (0, 11, 0).
The following Bankruptcy equilibrium is pareto efficient, strongly pareto dominates the GEI equilibrium and cannot be pareto dominated by the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Therefore, even when asset markets are incomplete and the GEI equilibrium is strongly pareto inefficient, a Bankruptcy equilibrium can result in an efficient market outcome. Suppose (e(1), e(2)) = (1, 1), C 1 (q) = 19×9 10 q, and
is an equilibrium with utilities (U 1 , U 2 ) = (1151, 1000). To see that this is a Bankruptcy equilibrium, substitute ξ = 9 in the parameterization given below. In a parameterized version of this example, we can see that an increase in the credit limit of a debtor increases the equilibrium trade in the asset, and the equilibrium utility of the creditor even though, in some state of the world, the creditor expects the debtor to be bankrupt, and cause her greater losses. Therefore, creditors might want to make it easier for a debtor to take on more debt even when they expect the debtor to be bankrupt in some state of the world. Suppose (e(1), e(2)) = (1, 1). Fix ξ ∈ [1, 9] and let C 1 (q) = (10+ξ)ξ 10 q and C 2 (q) = 10+ξ 10 q. Then
is an equilibrium with utilities (U 1 , U 2 ) = (1160 − ξ, 100 + 100ξ). Notice that this equilibrium allocation is pareto efficient. To check that this is an equilibrium, notice that all markets are clearing, the default rate calculations are correct, and for each agent, her plan is in her budget set. The only thing left to confirm is that agents are optimizing. Let us first look at the plan for agent 1. Substituting the value of q in the credit limit for agent 1 gives us, for portfolio admissibility,
Since the coefficient for z 1 is negative, the optimal portfolio choice is zero, and the corresponding utility is U 1 = 160. If −ξ ≤ z 1 ≤ 0, then U 1 = 100(1 − q p 1 z 1 ) + 10 + z 1 + 50 = 160 + (1 − 1000 ξ )z 1 , so that the optimal portfolio choice is z 1 = −ξ, and the corresponding utility is U 1 = 1160 − ξ. Therefore, the given plan is optimal in the budget set for agent 1. For agent 2, substituting the value of q in the credit limit for agent 1 gives us, for portfolio admissibility,
Since the coefficient for z 2 is positive, the optimal portfolio choice is z 2 = 10 ξ 10 , and the corresponding utility is U 2 = 100 + 100ξ. If −1 ≤ z 2 ≤ 0, then U 2 = 110 + (100 − 10 ξ )z 2 , so that the optimal portfolio choice is 0, and the corresponding utility is U 2 = 110. Therefore, the given plan is optimal in the budget set for agent 2.
Notice that in this parameterizaton, when ξ = 9, the equilibrium allocation is very close to the equilibrium allocation for the Arrow-Debreu model. It is the exemption in state 1 which prevents the creditor from recovering the last unit of consumption from the debtor. This creates an incentive for the creditor to lobby for lower exemptions. One might guess that if the exemption in state 1 were lower the creditor is willing to extend even more credit to the debtor. This is correct, as shown below.
In the following Bankruptcy equilibrium the allocation is the same as the one in the unique equilibrium in the corresponding Arrow-Debreu economy. Therefore, even when asset markets are incomplete and the GEI equilibrium is strongly pareto inefficient, a Bankruptcy equilibrium can overcome market incompleteness, and achieve the same allocation as in the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Suppose (e(1), e(2)) = (0, 1), C 1 (q) = 20q, and C 2 (q) = 2q. Then
is an equilibrium with utilities (U 1 , U 2 ) = (1150, 1100). To see that this is a Bankruptcy equilibrium, substitute ξ = 0 in the parameterization given below. In another parameterized version of this example, we can see that a decrease in the exemption in state 1 can further increase the equilibrium trade in the asset, and the equilibrium utility of the creditor, and decrease the equilibrium utility of the debtor. Therefore, creditors want to lobby a legislature for lower exemptions, and debtors want to oppose such a measure. Fix ξ ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose (e(1), e(2)) = (ξ, 1), C 1 (q) = is an equilibrium with utilities (U 1 , U 2 ) = (1150 + ξ, 1100 − 100ξ). Notice that this equilibrium allocation is pareto efficient. To check that this is an equilibrium, notice that all markets are clearing, the default rate calculations are correct, and for each agent, her plan is in her budget set. The only thing left to confirm is that agents are optimizing. Let us first look at the plan for agent 1. Substituting the value of q in the credit limit for agent 1 gives us, for portfolio admissibility, z 1 − ≤ 10 − ξ. If z 1 ≥ 0, then U 1 = 100(1 − q p 1 z 1 ) + 10 + (1 − α(1))z 1 + 50(1 + (1 − α(2))z 1 ) = 160 + (1 − 1000 10−ξ )z 1 . Since the coefficient for z 1 is negative, the optimal portfolio choice is zero, and the corresponding utility is U 1 = 160. If ξ − 10 ≤ z 1 ≤ 0, then U 1 = 100(1 − q p 1 z 1 )+10+z 1 +50 = 160 + (1 − 1000 10−ξ )z 1 , so that the optimal portfolio choice is z 1 = ξ − 10, and the corresponding utility is U 1 = 1150 + ξ. Therefore, the given plan is optimal in the budget set for agent 1. For agent 2, substituting the value of q in the credit limit for agent 1 gives us, for portfolio admissibility, z 2 − ≤ 1 − ξ. If z 2 ≥ 0, then U 2 = (10 − q p 1 z 2 ) + 100(1 + (1 − α(1))z 2 ) + (1 − α(2))z 2 = 110 + (100 − 10 10−ξ )z 2 . Since the coefficient for z 2 is positive, the optimal portfolio choice is z 2 = 10 10−ξ 10 , and the corresponding utility is U 2 = 1100 − ξ. If ξ − 1 ≤ z 2 ≤ 0, then U 2 = 110 + (100 − 10 10−ξ )z 2 , so that the optimal portfolio choice is 0, and the corresponding utility is U 2 = 110. Therefore, the given plan is optimal in the budget set for agent 2.
A summary of the different versions of this example is given in Table 2 at the end of the paper.
Extensions and Conclusion
This section presents some ways in which we may modify and extend the model.
In the model, a credit limit is specified in units of the asset or in units of good = 1 (depending on the asset return matrix). However, we sometimes observe that a credit limit is specified in units of value. It is easy to modify the model to allow for admissibility of a portfolio plan to depend on value of promised delivery instead of quantity. If we rename admissibility in the model as quantity admissibility, and call by value admissibility the admissibility of a portfolio plan depending on value of promised delivery, and use these concepts to redefine the budget and demand sets, we get two definitions of equilibrium. However, every equilibrium with quantity admissibility is also an equilibrium with value admissibility and vice versa. (This is because strong monotonicity and continuity of preferences implies that in every equilibrium -whether with quantity or value admissibility -the price of every good is positive. Therefore, the budget set with quantity admissibility and the one with value admissibility coincide and hence so do the demand sets.)
The model can be extended to include assets which promise to pay in more than one good as follows. The basic concepts, except the assumptions about payoffs of assets, remain the same. The payoffs of the assets in period t, state s are summarized by a L × J matrix A t (s). Its j-th component, A t (s) ,j , specifies the (non-negative) payoff of asset j in period t, state s in terms of good . As in the model, assume that for every s, A 1 (s) is the zero matrix, and to reflect the dependence of asset returns on the information available, assume that for every t, A t (·) is S t -measurable. An asset structure is a collection of asset return matrices, A = (A t (s)) s,t . The rights of creditors and debtors remain the same. To determine the financial position of an agent, in all the definitions, pre-multiply A t (s) by p t (s) instead of p t (s) 1 . A credit limit for agent i is a continuous function C i : Q × R J + → R LJ + that is weakly decreasing in β. As in the model, assume the measurability and boundedness conditions, and assume that for every , j, s, t with t ≤ T −1, µ( i ∈ I inf q∈Qt(s) j ,β∈R J + C i (q, β) t (s) ,j > 0 ) > 0, and if q t (s) j = 0 then µ( i ∈ I C i (q, 0) t (s) ,j = 0 ) = µ(I). A portfolio plan z i is (C i , p, q, α) The lemma on bound on asset sales remains true as stated. Its proof needs an obvious modification. The budget set, demand set, economy, and equilibrium are defined as in the model. Theorem 1 remains true as stated. Theorem 2 is true if everywhere in its statement, we replace j by , j. The proofs require minor and obvious modifications. The examples obviously remains true. Thus, the model can be extended to include assets which promise to pay in more than one good. In the model, exemptions are specified in each period and state by comparing the endowment value of each good in that period and state to the corresponding exemption value of that good. This can be modified to allow for different ways of calculating exemptions. For example, it is easy to modify the definition of exemption to compare the value of the endowment bundle in each period t, state s with the value of the corresponding exemption bundle. Other than a change in the definition of exemption value, the theorems and the examples are valid, and the proof remains the same. For another example, although the U.S. Constitution gives the power to establish bankruptcy law to the Federal government, in practice, different states have different exemptions. We can modify the model in this paper by using another parameter to index agent's by state, by specifying a strictly positive exemption bundle by state, and then calculating exemptions either in the manner specified in the model in the paper, or in the modification presented earlier in this paragraph. Again, the results and the examples in the paper are valid. More general formulas for calculating exemption values are also feasible; what is important in the proof of existence of equilibrium is that agents have positive income.
These modifications and extensions can be combined to derive a model in which assets promise delivery of many goods, and in which admissibility of a portfolio plan depends on value of promised delivery. A version of the two theorems is true for any economy represented by this derived model, and the examples given in the paper are valid.
The model in this paper incorporates a notion of personal bankruptcy in general equilibrium with incomplete markets. In this model, there is unsecured lending, the rights of debtors and creditors are derived from the existing legal framework, an agent's default history affects his future trading opportunity, and bankruptcy arises in a manner similar to what we observe. Every economy represented by this model has an equilibrium, and with minor additional assumptions, every economy has a non-trivial equilibrium. This model is robust in the sense that using it, we can easily see well-known welfare effects of bankruptcy.
This model can be used to investigate the effects on resource allocation in competitive markets of different bankruptcy rules (exemptions, recovery rules, priority rules), of different credit limit systems (the weight that should be put on an agent's default history, on expectations of an agent's future income, on riskiness of assets), and of chain reactions (the role of pessimistic expectations, controlling and mitigating the effects of such reactions, the role of credit limits and exemptions in propagating and controlling such reactions). is an equilibrium with utilities (U 1 , U 2 ) = (1150 + ξ, 1100 − 100ξ).
